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Abstract. The act of persuasion, a key component in rhetoric argumentation,
may be viewed as a dynamics modifier. We extend Dung’s frameworks with acts
of persuasion among agents, and consider interactions among attack, persuasion
and defence that have been largely unheeded so far. We characterise basic no-
tions of admissibilities in this framework, and show a way of enriching them
through, effectively, CTL (computation tree logic) encoding, which also permits
importation of the theoretical results known to the logic into our argumentation
frameworks. Our aim is to complement the growing interest in coordination of
static and dynamic argumentation.
1 Introduction
An interesting component of rhetoric argumentation is persuasion. We
may code an act of it into A: a1© 99K B:a2© (a1 B:a3© with the follow-
ing intended meaning: some agent A’s argument a1 persuades an agent
B into holding a3; B, being persuaded, drops a2. There can be various
reasons for the persuasive act. It may be that A is a great teacher wanting
to correct some inadvisable norm of B’s, or perhaps A is a manipula-
tor who benefits if a2 is not present. Persuasion is popularly observed in
social forums including YouTube and Twitter, and methods to represent
it will help understand users’ views on topics accurately. Another less
pervasive form of persuasion is possible: A:a1© ( B:a3© in which A
persuades B with a1 into expressing a3 but without conversion. In either
of the cases, persuasion acts as a dynamics modifier in rhetoric argumen-
tation, allowing some argument to appear and disappear.
Of course - and this is one highlight of this paper - these acts will not
be successful if a1 is detected to be not a defensible argument: we may
have C: a3© → A:a1© ( B:a2© where a3 attacks a1. Suppose now that
B is aware of a3, then B can defend against A’s persuasion due to a3’s
attack on a1. B is not persuaded into holding a2 in such a case. We will
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care for the interactions between attack, persuasion and defence.
While AGM-like argumentation framework revisions defining a class
of argumentation frameworks to result from an initially given argumen-
tation framework and an input (which could be argument(s), attack(s)
or both), and persuasion in the context of (often two-parties) dialogue
games, are being studied, there are very few studies in the literature that
pursue coordination of statics and dynamics. One exception is the dy-
namic logic for programs adapted for argumentation by Doutre et al.
[20,21], which is rich in expressiveness with non-deterministic opera-
tions, tests, sequential operations. Bridging dynamics and statics is im-
portant for detailed and more precise analysis of rhetoric argumentation.
So far, however, the above-said interaction between attack, persuasion
and defence has been largely unheeded. We first of all fill the gap by de-
veloping an abstract persuasion argumentation, an extension to Dung’s
argumentation theory [22]. We formulate the notion of static admissibil-
ity for our theory, and then show a way of diversifying it into other types
of admissibilities through, effectively, CTL (computation tree logic) em-
bedding.
1.1 Example situations
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Defence and reference set One aspect that has not been shed much
light on in the literature of dynamic argumentation is defence against
such persuasive acts (dynamic operations). Let us consider an example.
a2 (Mr. X) Elma does not like the music.
a3 (Mr. Z) We should get a piano.
a4 (Mrs. Y) We can buy Elma a Hello Kitty shoulder bag.
a5 (Mrs. Y) We will go to Yamaha Music Communications Co., Ltd. for
a piano.
The relation among them is as shown in Figure A ( B ): there is an
attack from a2 to a3, and there is also a persuasion act by (Mr. Z holding)
a3 trying to convert a4 into a5. Suppose that a5 is not initially on Mrs.
Y’s mind, that is, that it is not visible initially. If the persuasion by Mr.
Z is successful, Mrs. Y changes her mind, dropping a4 and gaining a5.
Otherwise, she holds onto a4. In Dung theory, defence of an argument
ax is defined with respect to a set of arguments A. The reference set A
defends ax just when A’s members attack all arguments attacking ax. We
see that this concept may be extended also to persuasion operations. For
example, if, as marked with a rectangular box in Figure A , the reference
set consists of a4 and a5 alone, it does not detect any flaw in a3. Thus,
the persuasion is successful with respect to the reference set. However,
if it also contains a2 attacking a3 as in Figure B , it can prevent the
persuasion from taking effect on a4.
Multiple persuasions We have a kind of concurrency scenario when
multiple persuasions act on an argument. Let us consider an example.
a1 (Alice at London Bridge, having agreed to see Bob at 7 pm) I am
going to have dinner with Bob. It is 7 pm now. He should be arriving
soon.
a2 (Tom, calling from Camden) Chris (Alice’s brother) is looking for
you. He is at Camden Bar. He says there is some urgent matter, can
you please get to the bar as soon as possible?
a3 (Katie, seeing Alice by chance) Hey Alice, you’ve left your laptop at
King’s library? You better go there now. Oh, and don’t forget about
your presentation tomorrow morning. Make sure you have slides
ready!
Having been acquainted with Bob only recently, Alice is more inclined
to getting to Camden Bar or to King’s library. That is, a4: I am going to
Camden Bar, or a5: I am going to King’s library. She knows her brother
is very stern. But the assignment of which Katie reminded Alice seems
to be a thing that must be prioritised, too. Whichever option she is to
go for, she must, thinks she, come up with excuses to justify her choice.
Therefore:
a6 (Alice’s excuse) It is fine to skip dinner because I waited for Bob at
London Bridge and he did not arrive in time. Besides, I suddenly have
something urgent.
a7 (Alice’s excuse) I cannot see Chris. For my career, it is important that
I perform well at presentation tomorrow. Chris will understand.
a8 (Alice’s excuse) I cannot go to King’s library now, because it is al-
ways urgent when Chris calls me.
Figure C represents these arguments. Now, what we have is a poten-
tially irreversible branching. If a2 persuades a1 into a4, it is no longer
possible for a3 to persuade a1, as a1 will not be available for persuasion.
If a3 persuades a1 into a5, on the other hand, it is no longer possible that
a2 persuades a1. A certain partial order may be defined among persuasion
(as in preference-based argumentation), but the non-deterministic consid-
eration leads to a more general theory (as in probabilistic argumentation)
in which the actual behaviour of a system depends on run-time execu-
tions.
Just as in program analysis, however, it may be still possible to iden-
tify certain properties, whichever an actual path may be. In this particular
example, (Alice holding) a1 may be persuaded into holding a4 or else
a5, and we cannot tell which with certainty. However, we can certainly
predict a8’s emergence. Thus, by obtaining varieties in arguments admis-
sibility by means of CTL, we can answer such a query as ‘Is a8 going to
be an admissible argument in whatever order persuasive acts may take
place?’.
2 Technical Backgrounds
Let A be a class of abstract entities which we understand as arguments.
We denote any member of A by a with or without a subscript, and any
finite subset of A by A with or without a subscript. An argumentation
framework [22] is a tuple (A,R) where R is a binary relation over A.
Let F (A,R)(A1) denote (A1, R∩ (A1×A1)), we denote by 2(A,R) the fol-
lowing set:
⋃
A1⊆A F
(A,R)(A1), i.e. all sub-argumentation frameworks of
(A,R). When confusion is unlikely to occur, we abbreviate F (A,R)(A1)
for some A1 by F (A1).
For any (A,R) an argument a1 ∈ A is said to attack a2 ∈ A if and
only if, or iff, (a1, a2) ∈ R. A set of arguments A1 ⊆ A is said to defend
ax ∈ A iff each ay ∈ A attacking ax is attacked by at least one argument
in A1. A set of arguments A1 ⊆ A is said to be: conflict-free iff no mem-
ber of A1 attacks a member of A1; admissible iff it is conflict-free and it
defends all the members of A1; complete iff it is admissible and includes
any argument it defends; preferred iff it is a set-theoretically maximal ad-
missible set; stable iff it is preferred and attacks every argument inA\A1;
and grounded iff it is the set intersection of all complete sets of A.
3 Abstract Persuasion Argumentation
We define our Abstract Persuasion Argumentation (APA) framework to
be a tuple (A,R,Rp, A0, ↪→) for A0 ⊆ A, for a ternary relation
Rp : A × (A ∪ {}) × A and for another ↪→: 2A × (2(A,R) × 2(A,R)).
For Rp, (a1, , a2) ∈ Rp represents a1 ( a2 (passive persuasion or to
induce), and (a1, a2, a3) ∈ Rp represents a1 99K a2 (a1 a3 (active persua-
sion or to convert). We refer to a subset of Rp by Γ with or without a
subscript and/or a superscript.
APA is a dynamic argumentation framework where arguments can
appear (go visible) or disappear (go invisible). As in a transition system,
it comes with an initial state and a transition relation ↪→. For any APA
framework (A,R,Rp, A0, ↪→), we define a state to be a member F (Ax)
of 2(A,R), and we say any argument that occurs in a state visible and any
that does not occur in the state invisible, in each case at that particular
state.1 We define F (A0) to be the initial state.
Example 1. In Elma example, we assumed A0 = {a2, a3, a4} and
F (A0) = (A0, {(a2, a3)}). In Alice example, A0 = {a1, a2, a3} and
F (A0) = (A0, ∅).
Definition 1 (Reachable states). For APA (A,R,Rp, A0, ↪→), for a set
of arguments Ax ⊆ A, and for states F (A1) and F (A2), we say that
there is a transition from F (A1) to F (A2) with respect to Ax iff it holds
that (Ax, (F (A1), F (A2))) ∈↪→, which we alternatively state either as
(F (A1), F (A2)) ∈↪→Ax or as F (A1) ↪→Ax F (A2). We say that a state
F (Ax) is reachable iff F (Ax) either is the initial state or else is such that
F (A0) ↪→Ai1 · · · ↪→Ain F (Ax), 1 ≤ n.
A reachable state is a static snapshot of an APA framework at one mo-
ment, which is a Dung argumentation framework. To enumerate all reach-
able states, it suffices to define ↪→ in specific detail. And this is where the
1 We assume the standard notion of occurrence.
notion of defence against persuasive acts with respect to a reference set
at a state - specifically visible arguments of the set at the state - comes
into play:
Definition 2 (Possible persuasion acts). For APA (A,R,Rp, A0, ↪→),
we say that a persuasion act (a1, α, a2) ∈ Rp, α ∈ {} ∪ A, is possible
with respect to: (i) a reference set Ax ⊆ A; and (ii) a state F (Au) iff
a1, α ∈ Au ∪ {} and a1 is not attacked by any member of Ax ∩ Au. We
denote the set of all members of Rp that are possible with respect to a
reference set Ax ⊆ A and a state F (Au) by ΓAxF (Au).
Example 2. (Continued) In Elma example with A0 = {a2, a3, a4}, there
is one argument, a2, which is in A0 (thus visible), and which attacks a3,
so (a2, a3, a4) ∈ Rp is possible with respect to Ax ⊆ A and F (A0) only
if a2 6∈ Ax. ΓAxF (A0) is: {(a2, a3, a4)} if a2 6∈ Ax; ∅, otherwise. In Alice
example withA0 = {a1, a2, a3}, (a2, a1, a4) and (a3, a1, a5) are both pos-
sible with respect to anyAx ⊆ A and F (A0), because for no (ax, α, ay) ∈
Rp there is (az, ax) ∈ R. ΓAxF (A0) = {(a2, a1, a4), (a3, a1, a5)}.
Since transition as we consider is non-deterministic, each persuasion act
possible in a state may or may not execute for transition. Therefore, for
any APA (A,R,Rp, A0, ↪→), any reference set Ax ⊆ A and any state
F (A1), there are 2
|ΓAx
F (A1)
| − 1 transitions, though some of them may be
identical.
Definition 3 (Non-deterministic transition).
For APA (A,R,Rp, A0, ↪→), for A1 ⊆ A and for Γ ⊆ Rp, let negA1(Γ )
be {ax ∈ A1 | ∃a1, a2 ∈ A1.(a1, ax, a2) ∈ Γ}, and let posA1(Γ ) be
{a2 ∈ A1 | ∃a1, α ∈ A1 ∪ {}.(a1, α, a2) ∈ Γ}. For Ax ⊆ A and
states F (A1) and F (A2), we define: F (A1) ↪→Ax F (A2) iff there is some
∅ ⊂ Γ ⊆ ΓAxF (A1) ⊆ Rp such that A2 = (A1\negA1(Γ )) ∪ posA1(Γ ).
For Γ ⊆ Rp, if Γ ⊆ ΓAxF (A1), it is a (non-deterministically) chosen set
of possible persuasion acts at F (A1). Thus, negA1(Γ ) is the set of all
visible arguments that are to be converted, and posA1(Γ ) is that of all
visible arguments that are to be generated, in the transition. As clear from
this definition, while every member of posA1(Γ ), if not visible in F (A1),
will be visible in F (A2), not necessarily every member of negA1(Γ ) will
be invisible in F (A2) in case it also belongs to posA1(Γ ), in which case
the effect is offset.
Example 3. Consider the argumentation in the figures below, in each
of which visible arguments are marked with a black border around the
circle. SupposeA0 = {a1, a2} as in Figure D . At F (A0), there are more
than one possible persuasion acts: ΓAxF (A0) = {(a1, a2, a4), (a2, a1, a3)}
for any reference set Ax ⊆ A. There are three transitions for F (A0),
depending on which one(s) execute simultaneously. If just (a1, a2, a4),
a2 will go invisible, while a4 will be visible, so we have F (A0) ↪→Ax
F (A1) (Figure E ) for any Ax. If just (a2, a1, a3), we have F (A0) ↪→Ay
F (A2) (Figure F ) for any Ay. Or both of them may execute at once, in
which case both a1 and a2 will be invisible, and a3 and a4 meanwhile
will be visible, so we have F (A0) ↪→Az F (A3) (Figure G ) for any
Az. Reasoning similarly for the new states, we eventually enumerate all
reachable states and all transitions among them:
s
a4
A0: {a1, a2}
a1a2 a3
a1
a2
D
s
a4
A1: {a1, a4}
a1a2 a3
a1
a2
E
s
a4
A2: {a2, a3}
a1a2 a3
a1
a2
F
s
a4
A3: {a3, a4}
a1a2 a3
a1
a2
G
s
a4
A4: {a2, a3, a4}
a1a2 a3
a1
a2
H
s
a4
A5: {a1, a3, a4}
a1a2 a3
a1
a2
I
s
a4
A6: {a1, a2, a3, a4}
a1a2 a3
a1
a2
J
– F (A0) ↪→Ax F (A1), F (A0) ↪→Ay F (A2), F (A0) ↪→Az F (A3).
– F (A1) ↪→Au F (A1).
– F (A2) ↪→Av F (A2).
– F (A3) ↪→Ap F (A4), F (A3) ↪→Aq F (A5), F (A3) ↪→Ar F (A6).
– F (A4) ↪→Ai F (A4), F (A4) ↪→Aj F (A6).
– F (A5) ↪→Ak F (A5), F (A5) ↪→Ac F (A6).
– F (A6) ↪→Ad F (A4), F (A6) ↪→Af F (A5), F (A6) ↪→Ag F (A6).
The reference sets for the transitions are any subset of {a1, a2, a3, a4}.
Notice, apart from the trivial self-transitions, states could oscillate in-
finitely between F (A4), F (A5) and F (A6).
Proposition 1. Suppose an APA framework δ with a finite number of ar-
guments. It is necessary that the number of (reachable) states is finite. It
is, however, not necessary that the number of transitions in δ is finite.
3.1 Admissibilities
We now define the static notion of admissibility in APA frameworks,
based on three criteria. For APA (A,R,Rp, A0, ↪→),
Conflict-freeness We say that A1 ⊆ A is conflict-free in a (reachable)
state F (Ax) iff no member of A1 ∩ Ax attacks a member of A1 ∩ Ax.
Defendedness We say that a reference set A1 ⊆ A defends a ∈ A in
a state F (Ax) iff either a 6∈ Ax or else both of the conditions below hold.
1. Every au ∈ Ax attacking a is attacked by at least one member of
Ax ∩ A1 (counter-attack).
2. There is no state F (Ay) such that both F (Ax) ↪→A1 F (Ay) and a 6∈
Ay at once (no elimination).
We say that A1 ⊆ A is defended in a state F (Ax) iff A1 as a reference
set defends every member of its in F (Ax).
Properness We say that Au ⊆ A is proper in a state F (Ax) iff Au ⊆ Ax.
Defendedness above extends Dung’s defendedness naturally for Rp.
Properness ensures that we will not be talking of invisible arguments.
With these properties, we say Au ⊆ A is: admissible in a state F (A1)
iff Au is conflict-free, defended and proper in F (A1); complete in a state
F (A1) iff Au is admissible in F (A1) and includes all arguments it de-
fends; preferred iff no Av ⊆ A that is complete in a state F (A1) is a
strict superset of Au; stable iff it is preferred and attacks every member
of A1\Au; and grounded in a state F (A1) iff it is the set intersection of
all complete sets in F (A1). Since each state is a Dung argumentation
framework, we have:
Proposition 2. For APA (A,R,Rp, A0, ↪→), for a state F (A1) and for
Ax ⊆ A1: if Ax is stable, then Ax is preferred; if Ax is preferred, then
Ax is complete; if Ax is complete, then Ax is admissible; there exists at
least one complete set; and there may not exist any stable set.
For general admissibilities across transition, one way of describing more
varieties is to embed this state-wise admissibility and transitions into
computation tree logic (CTL) or other branching-time logic, by which
model-theoretical results known to the logic become available to APA
frameworks, too. We consider CTL with some path restrictions. Denote
{ad, co,pr, st,gr} byΩ, and refer to a member ofΩ by ω. Let the gram-
mar of φ be:
φ := ⊥ | > | a∈˙δAx | Pδ(ω,Ax) | ¬φ | φ∧φ | φ∨φ | φ ⊃ φ | AXΣφ |
EXΣφ | AFΣφ | EFΣφ | AGΣφ | EGΣφ | EΣ[φUφ] | AΣ[φUφ]
where both a∈˙δAx and Pδ(ω,Ax) are atomic predicates for an APA frame-
work δ := (A,R,Rp, A0, ↪→), with Ax ⊆ A, with a ∈ A and with
Σ ⊆ 2A. A is ‘in all branches’, E is ‘in some branch’, X is ‘next state’,
F is ‘future state’, G is ‘all subsequent states’, and U is ‘until’. The su-
perscripts restrict paths to only those reachable with member(s) of Σ as
reference set(s). See below for the exact semantics. We denote the class
of all atomic predicates for δ by Pδ. For semantics, let L : Ω×2A → 2Pδ
be a valuation function such that L(ω,Ax) is:
– {Pδ(ad, Ay) ∈ Pδ | Ay is admissible in F (Ax)} if ω = ad.
– {Pδ(co, Ay) ∈ Pδ | Ay is complete in F (Ax)} if ω = co.
– {Pδ(pr, Ay) ∈ Pδ | Ay is preferred in F (Ax)} if ω = pr.
– {Pδ(st, Ay) ∈ Pδ | Ay is stable in F (Ax)} if ω = st.
– {Pδ(gr, Ay) ∈ Pδ | Ay is grounded in F (Ax)} if ω = gr.
We define M := (δ, L) to be a transition system with the following
forcing relations.2
– M, A1 |= >.
– M, A1 6|= ⊥.
– M, A1 |= a∈˙δAx iff a ∈ Ax.
2 The liberty of allowing arguments intoM causes no confusion, let alone issues. If one is so
inclined, he/she may choose to consider that components of δ that appear inM are seman-
tic counterparts of those that appear in the syntax of CTL with one-to-one correspondence
between them.
– M, A1 |= Pδ(ω,Ax) iff Pδ(ω,Ax) ∈ L(ω,A1) (in plain terms, this says
Ax is admissible / complete / preferred / stable / grounded in a state
F (A1)).
– M, A1 |= ¬φ iffM, A1 6|= φ.
– M, A1 |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iffM, A1 |= φ1 andM, A1 |= φ2.
– M, A1 |= φ1 ∨ φ2 iffM, A1 |= φ1 orM, A1 |= φ2.
– M, A1 |= φ1 ⊃ φ2 iffM, A1 6|= φ1 orM, A1 |= φ2.
– M, A1 |= AXΣφ iff M, A2 |= φ for each transition F (A1) ↪→Ax
F (A2), Ax ∈ Σ.
– M, A1 |= EXΣφ iff there is some transition F (A1) ↪→Ax F (A2), Ax ∈
Σ, such thatM, A2 |= φ.
– M, A1 |= AFΣφ iff there is some i ≥ 0 for each transition F (A1) ↪→Aj1
· · · ↪→Aji F (Ai+1)(↪→Ax · · · ), Ajk ∈ Σ for 1 ≤ k ≤ i+ 1, such that
M, Ai+1 |= φ.
– M, A1 |= EFΣφ iff there are some i ≥ 1 and a transition F (A1) ↪→Aj1
· · · ↪→Aji F (Ai+1)(↪→Ax · · · ), Ajk ∈ Σ for 1 ≤ k ≤ i+ 1, such that
M, Ai+1 |= φ.
– M, A1 |= AGΣφ iffM, Ak |= φ for each transition F (A1) ↪→Aj1 · · · ,
Ajn ∈ Σ for 1 ≤ n, such that F (Ak) occurs in the transition sequence.
– M, A1 |= EGΣφ iff there is some transition F (A1) ↪→Aj1 · · · ,Ajn ∈ Σ
for 1 ≤ n, such thatM, Ak |= φ and that F (Ak) occurs in the transition
sequence.
– M, A1 |= AΣ[φ1Uφ2] iff there exists some i ≥ 0 for each transition
F (A1) ↪→Aj1 · · · ↪→Aji F (Ai+1)(↪→Ax · · · ) such that M, Ai+1 |= φ2
and thatM, Ak |= φ1 for all k < i+ 1.
– M, A1 |= EΣ[φ1Uφ2] iff there exists some i ≥ 0 and a transition
F (A1) ↪→Aj1 · · · ↪→Aji F (Ai+1)(↪→Ax · · · ) such that M, Ai+1 |= φ2
and thatM, Ak |= φ1 for all k < i+ 1.
We say that φ is true (in δ) iff (δ, L), A0 |= φ.
While this logic appears more graded than CTL for the superscripts
Σ, there is an obvious encoding of it into the standard CTL with an ad-
ditional atomic predicate in the grammar of φ that judges whether an
argument is visible. That is, we can for example replace EX{Ax}φ with
EX(φ1 ∧φ)∨ · · · ∨EX(φn ∧φ) if we can express by the expression that,
for any transition F (Ac) ↪→Ax F (Ad) such that F (Ac) is the state with
respect to which the expression is evaluated, there exists some 1 ≤ i ≤ n
such that φi holds good just when all and only members of Ad are vis-
ible, and that for every φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists some Ad such that
F (Ac) ↪→Ax F (Ad) and that φi holds good just when all members of Ad
are visible, which confirms that our logic is effectively CTL. It is straight-
forward to see the following well-known equivalences in our semantics:
Proposition 3 (De Morgan’s Laws and Expansion Laws).
¬AFΣφ ≡ EGΣ¬φ, ¬EFΣφ ≡ AGΣ¬φ, ¬AXΣφ ≡ EGΣ¬φ (De Mor-
gan’s Laws),AGΣφ ≡ φ∧AXΣAGΣφ,EGΣφ ≡ φ∧EXΣEGΣφ,AFΣφ ≡
φ ∨ AXΣAFΣφ, EFΣφ ≡ φ ∨ EXΣEFΣφ, AΣ[φ1Uφ2] ≡ φ2 ∨ (φ1 ∧
AXΣAΣ[φ1Uφ2]), EΣ[φ1Uφ2] ≡ φ2∨ (φ1∧EXΣEΣ[φ1Uφ2]) (Expansion
Laws) .
Proof is by induction on the size (the number of symbols) of φ for eachΣ.
Other well-known general properties of CTL immediately hold true, such
as existence of a sound and complete axiomatisation of CTL. Atomic
entailments are decidable for any APA δ (with a finite number of argu-
ments), since each state is a Dung argumentation framework.
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Example 4. For Elma example (re-listed above in Figure X that marks
initially visible arguments), recall A0 = {a2, a3, a4}. Denote the argu-
mentation by δ. By stating that (a5∈˙δA1∧EF{A1}Pδ(ad, A1)) ⊃ ¬a2∈˙δA1
is true, we have stated that if a2 is a member of a reference set A1, and
if the same reference set is used for all transitions, A1 that contains a5 is
never admissible.
For Alice example (re-listed above in Figure Y that marks initially
visible arguments), recall A0 = {a1, a2, a3}. Denote the argumentation
by δ. By stating that (AF{A1}AG{A1}Pδ(co, A1)) ⊃ a8∈˙δA1 is true, we
have stated that if a set of arguments A1 is such that, in all branches with
A1 as the reference set, it will be permanently complete from some state
on, then it must include a8.
For the example in Figure D (re-listed above), recall A0 = {a1, a2}
within A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. Assume: Exct({ai1 , . . . , ain}, A2) ≡
((ai1∈˙δA2)∧ · · · ∧ (ain∈˙δA2))∧ (¬ain+1∈˙δA2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬aim∈˙δA2) where
A2 ⊆ A and where {ai1 , . . . , aim} ≡ {a1, . . . , a4} ≡ A. Assume also
that Σ = 2A.
By Exct({a2, a3, a4}, A4) ∧ Exct({a1, a3, a4}, A5) ∧
AGΣ((Pδ(ad, A4) ⊃ EFΣ(Pδ(ad, A5) ∧ ¬Pδ(ad, A4)))
∧ (Pδ(ad, A5) ⊃ EFΣ(Pδ(ad, A4) ∧ ¬Pδ(ad, A5)))),
we have described that when either of A4 and A5 is admissible in some
reachable state, there is always a branch where the other becomes admis-
sible and that becomes not admissible in some future state, that is to say,
there can be an infinite number of oscillation among states that admit
different sets of arguments.
Straightforwardly:
Proposition 4 (Non-monotonicity of admissibility).
Suppose APA (A,R,Rp, A0, ↪→), and suppose that a set of arguments
Ax ⊆ A is admissible in a reachable state F (A1). It is not necessary that
Ax be admissible in a state F (A2) which satisfies F (A1) ↪→Ay F (A2)
for some Ay ⊆ A.
4 Discussion and Related Work
For dynamics of argumentation, adaptation of the AGM-like belief re-
vision [1,28] to argumentation systems [9,19,18,15,16,34] is popularly
studied. In these studies, the focus is on restricting the class of result-
ing argumentation frameworks (post-states) by means of postulates for a
given argumentation-framework (pre-state) and some action (add/remove
an argument/attack/argumentation framework). In APA, generation by
inducement and modification by conversion are primarily defined. Re-
moval of an argument, however, is easily emulated through conversion
by setting a1 = a3 in (a1, a2, a3) ∈ Rp. In the literature of belief revision
theory, some consider selective revision [26], where a change to a belief
set takes place if the input that is attempting a change is accepted. While
such screening should be best assumed to have taken place beforehand
within belief revision, a similar idea is critical in argumentation theory
where defence of an argument is foundationally tied to a reference set of
arguments. Since any set of arguments may be chosen to be a reference
set, and since which arguments in the set are visible non-monotonically
changes, it is not feasible to assume some persuasion acts successful and
others not in all states.
Coordination of dynamics and statics is somehow under-investigated
in the literature of argumentation theory. A kind for coalition profitability
and formability semantics with what are termed conflict-eliminable sets
of arguments [4] focuses on the interaction between sets of arguments be-
fore and after coalition formation. Doutre et al. show the use of proposi-
tional dynamic logic in program analysis/verification for encoding Dung
theory and addition/removal of attacks and arguments [20,21]. The logic
comes with sequential operations, non-deterministic operations, tests. In
comparison to their logic, our theory is an extension to Dung theory,
which already provides a sound theoretical judgement for defence against
attacks, which we extended also to persuasion acts. As far as we could
fathom, such interaction between attack, persuasion, and defence has not
been primarily studied in the literature. For another, a Dung-based theory
has a certain appeal as a higher-level specification language. Consider the
argumentation in Figure D . APA requires 4 arguments, its subset as the
set of initially visible arguments, 2 inducements and 2 conversions for
specification of the dynamic argumentation. By contrast, specification of
a dynamic argumentation in the dynamic logic can be exponentially long
as the number of non-deterministic branches increases; for the same dy-
namic argumentation in Figure D , it requires descriptions of all possi-
ble reachable states and transitions among them for the specification. We
might take an analogy in chess here. While the number of branches in a
chess game is astronomical, the game itself is specifiable in a small set
of rules. For yet another, the dynamic logic facilitates dynamic changes
to attacks in addition to arguments, which we did not study in this paper.
The reason is mostly due to such consideration bound to lead to recursive
persuasions and attacks (for recursive attacks/supports, see [8,24,3,6,14])
in our theory, which we believe will be better detailed in a separate paper
for more formal interest.
Argumentation theories that accommodate aspects of persuasion have
been noted across several papers. In [10], argumentation frameworks
were augmented with values that controlled defeat judgement. Compared
to their work, persuasion acts in APA are stand-alone relations which
may be ‘executed’ non-deterministically and concurrently, may
irreversibly modify visible arguments, and may produce loops. In most of
argumentation papers on this topic, persuasion or negotiation is treated
in a dialogue game [11,2,12,23,25,27,30,31,32,33] where proponent(s)
and opponent(s) take turns to modify an argumentation framework. APA
does not assume the turn-based nature. In real-time rhetoric argumenta-
tion, as also frequently seen in social forums, more than one dialogue or
more than one line of persuasive act may be running simultaneously. In
this work, we were more interested in modelling those situations. The
various admissibility judgement enabled by (effectively) CTL (and other
branching-time logic) should provide means of describing many types of
argumentation queries.
Studies on temporal arguments include [29,7,5,13]. Most of these ac-
tually consider arguments that may be time-dependent. APA frameworks
keep arguments abstract, and observe temporal progress through actual
execution of persuasive acts. We use temporal logic for describing admis-
sibilities rather than arguments (recall that Pδ(ω,Ax) is a formula on ad-
missibility, not an argument). In timed argumentation frameworks [13],
arguments are available for set periods of time. Combined with APA, it
should become possible to explain how and why arguments are avail-
able for the durations of time in the frameworks, the explanatory power
incidentally having been the strength of argumentation theory.
5 Conclusion
We have shown a direction for abstract argumentation with dynamic op-
erators extending Dung’s theory. We set forth important properties and
notions, and showed embedding of state-wise admissibility into CTL for
various admissibilities across transitions. Many technical developments
are expected to follow. Our contribution is promising for bringing to-
gether knowledge of abstract argumentation in AI and techniques and
issues of concurrency in program analysis in a very near future. Cross-
studies in the two domains are highly expected. Study in concurrent as-
pects of argumentation is important for evaluation of opinion transitions,
which influences development of more effective sales approaches and
better marketing in business, and consensus control tactics in politics.
Harnessing our study with probabilistic methods is likely to form ex-
citing research. For future work, we plan to: take into account nuances
of persuasive acts such as pseudo-logic, scapegoating, threat, and half-
truths [17]; and extend APA with multi-reference sets.
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